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Andropov’s “Perestroika” and Soviet-
Czechoslovak relations in 1982–1984
There are countless studies of the economic history of the Soviet Union 
and its empire in scientifi c journals, papers, and books. Most of them are 
dedicated to the foundational period, the demise of the Eastern Bloc, or 
the revolutionary events in individual countries. However, the period 
with which the reader will become acquainted in this document is one of 
the less studied. 
In most of the works, the so-called transitional period between 
Brezhnev and Gorbachev is very often merely mentioned; but after a closer 
study of the period between 1982 and 1984, it is necessary to say that there 
were many important facts and trends. The personality of new General Se-
cretary was very complicated; the contradictions in his ideological, foreign 
and economic policy are even more interesting to study. Jury Andropov per-
sonifi es the image of the Soviet political fi gure, the Soviet Union, and the 
Soviet bloc, for the external observer; it is as if nothing has changed from 
time Winston Churchill’s quote about the Soviet Union, stating “It is a riddle, 
wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma”.1
In the second part of the paper, as part of the analysis of Andropov’s 
domestic and foreign policies, we will examine the infl uence that the new 
Soviet strategy had on Czechoslovak-Soviet relations, including its diff erent 
aspects of economic and scientifi c-technological cooperation.
First, it is necessary to briefl y evaluate the legacy of Brezhnev’s era, 
which Andropov had to face.
1) In: http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/31000.html, [cit. 12.April 2011].
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hand, Belgians sought to create limits for these workers in order to pre-
vent mass and uncontrolled migration which could threaten their own 
colonial economy. 
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Brezhnev’s legacy
Limits on modernization and symptoms of economic stagnation became evi-
dent in the Soviet economy in the 1970’s: technological development of indu-
strial facilities came to stop, obsolescence of machines and equipment acce-
lerated, and returns from capital investment in industry, especially in 
agriculture, swiftly diminished.2
The Party’s evaluation of the Brezhnev period’s regime was sum-
moned up in Mikhail Gorbachev speech after his election: “It was nothing 
else but conservative reaction to Khrushchev’s reform of then existed totalita-
rian model of state; although the new Constitution was adopted in 1979 and 
there were plenty of talks about democratic principles the Party’s power foun-
ded on, very little was done under Brezhnev to promote it and involve popula-
tion in this process; but at the same time the unprecedented campaign (after 
Stalin) against dissidents took place.”3
Brezhnev passed away in November 1982. After securing the sup-
port of the army (Ustinov), the KGB (Chebrikov), and the “reform-oriented” 
wing of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union4 (Gromyko, Gorbachev) 
during last months of his predecessor’s reign, Jury Andropov was elected as 
the General Secretary of CPSU, becoming eff ectively the fi rst Soviet leader 
with substantial experience in the State security committee – the KGB. 
The following are the characteristic features of Soviet Union in 
1982, Andropov took over as the new Soviet leader:
–  an increased tempo in militarization, the arms’ race, and the production of 
armaments
–  unilateral preferences in heavy-industry branches
–  an acute problem of “dolgostroj” (protracted construction)
–  high wear on equipment, infrastructure and transport facilities; technolo-
gical backwardness of Soviet technology
–  agricultural over-capitalization, old kolkhozes’ and sovkhozes’ structure, 
primitive tools and cultivation methods for soil and crops
2) T. I. BEREND, From the Soviet bloc to the European Union, New York 2009, p. 31.
3)  M. GORBACHEV, Zhizn’ i reformy [online]. [cit. 22. March 2011]. Available at <http://www.
gorby.ru/gorbachev/memoirs/>, p. 20.
4) The CPSU.
–  rapid urbanization, an aging population in the central regions of the Soviet 
Union inhibited by the Russian population
–  growing alcoholism among the population, degrading of social and living 
conditions (predominantly in smaller towns and Soviet villages); an unpre-
cedented decrease in average life expectancy (from 66 to 62 years over the 
period of 1980-1984)5
–  an ecological crisis6, continued devastation of natural resources, dislocati-
on of highly-polluted production in densely populated areas (mainly the 
bigger cities of the Russian Federation)
Andropov’s “Perestroika”
There was little information about the new General Secretary, apart from the 
biographical note printed in the “Pravda” newspaper the day after Andropov 
was elected. In the Soviet Union he was not widely known, and even less so in 
the West. Western newspapers contained a lot of speculation about the per-
sonality of the new Soviet leader; there were articles about Andropov being 
the “new Kennedy”, claiming that he “excels in culture”, he is a “secret liberal”, 
“pragmatic and open for political modernization and economic reform”, “li-
able to the Western infl uence”, and that he “spends his free time by reading 
American detectives, listens to jazz”. There was a positive response to Andro-
pov’s election even dissident circles and among Soviet emigration represen-
tatives (V. Bukovsky, R. Medvedev, or D. Litvinov).
According to Gorbachev, Andropov was well-informed about the 
situation in the country, and understood the threat of growing problems; 
because of his long tern as director of the KGB, Andropov received, apart 
from Brezhnev himself, the most valuable and factually accurate informati-
on about the state of the country and economy as a whole. Therefore, he knew 
also about severe fi nancial problem the Soviet Union then faced, and he was 
ready to combat them by “returning to Lenin’s legacy”, which he considered 
5) R. SAKWA, Soviet politics in perspective, New York 1998, p. 120.
6)  For a closer look in the particular ecological impacts of Soviet-style industry see contempo-
rary studies of Lake Aral tragedy, the consequences of nuclear tests in Northern Kazakh-
stan and Chelyabinsk region, Vorkuta and Norilsk agglomerations pollution etc.
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to be the most eff ective and appropriate method (as was typical for old high-
ranking Party offi  cials).7
Although a positive atmosphere surrounded the “election” of An-
dropov, to understand his personal qualities and intentions, we have to take 
a look at his past actions as a signifi cant political fi gure, those being the 
events occurring in Hungary (in 1956 when Andropov was Soviet ambassa-
dor to Hungary) and Czechoslovakia (in 1968, his fi rst year in charge of the 
KGB). The main lesson he derived from those events was how easily a commu-
nist party could lose power if it loosened its ideological control, or level of 
censorship, or if the fear in the society disappears; nothing else could reduce 
the power of the Party, not even economic diffi  culties or enemy actions.8
In his fi rst address as the General Secretary at the plenary session 
of CPSU on November 22, 1982, Andropov included passages detailing new 
approaches to the situation in the Soviet Union and the state of empire. An-
dropov stressed some serious defects of the economy, the non-fulfi llment of 
the two Five-year plans; the need to improve the performance of economics 
mechanisms, the stimulation of labor productivity, innovation, and the spi-
rit of state enterprise. He has also mentioned strengthening precision, disci-
pline, and control.9
Andropov’s intentions can be also found in the article in the “Com-
munist” journal article,10 where he submitted the idea that the Brezhnev’s sy-
stem of “developed socialism” was only the beginning of a long historic peri-
od, with an interior development emphasis, and he stressed the need to 
rethink the state of the Soviet society (“…a need to see the real dynamism of 
society”). Thereby, “Leninist ideas”,11 such as strict discipline, self-discipline, 
and orderliness, became the core of Andropov’s reforms directed at overco-
ming the crisis in the Soviet system. 
7)  M. GORBACHEV, Zhizn’ i reformy [online]. [cit. 22. March 2003]. Available at <http://www.
gorby.ru/gorbachev/memoirs/>, p. 32.
8)  R. MEDVEDEV, Andropov, Moscow 2006, p. 20.
9)  Introductory speech of J. V. Andropov as General Secretary (Pravda, 22 November 1982), in: 
Russian State archive of modern history, fund 89, inventory 67, unit 20, p. 5.
10)  J. V. ANDROPOV, Learning Carl Marx and other questions of socialist development, in: Kom-
munist, no. 3, 1983 in: Russian State archive of modern history, fund 89, inventory 61, 
unit 10, p. 2.
11) Same rhetoric as in Gorbachev’s 1985–86.
Although it is obvious today that the administrative system’s “bu-
reaucratic” treatment was not a winning strategy, the “new course”12 was 
endorsed by ordinary Soviet communists and citizens. Andropov chose the-
se measures in accordance with his past experience without any change to 
the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism, or an introduction of democratic 
elements (making it a “suppressing, rather than solving” strategy).
The deep built-in conservatism of Andropov’s thinking13 proved 
itself as an insurmountable obstacle for the new Soviet leader. Changes in 
ideology were never subjected to discussion,14 although he allowed, and even 
endorsed intra-Party democracy and discussion.15 Although, Andropov ne-
ver changed the Soviet evaluations of historical events, he did begin gradu-
ally removing Brezhnev’s cult of personality, which had been applied to all 
means of propaganda and mass media since 1970. 
His reforms were a new type of synthesis, one created by combi-
ning martial law and economic reorganization measures. He began with li-
miting the privileges of the nomenclature, fi ghting Brezhnev clan’s corrupt 
offi  cials, curtailing the powers of the most important institutions and lob-
bies (such as the military complex and Ministry of interior). Andropov’s reign 
primarily witnessed a deep shift away from the CPSU to other operating le-
vels of power, namely defense structures; even so that does not mean he ac-
cepted the decentralization of Party power. The stronger KGB role was aimed 
at buttressing the party’s leading role, not its degradation.
Thereby, his fi rst steps were profoundly political, above all reallo-
cation of cadres: Andropov began by persecuting his historical antagonists 
and the most corrupt Party offi  cials, associated with Brezhnev clan, fi rst of 
all fi gures of the interior minister M. Schelokov, the Krasnodar region Party 
leader P. Medunov, and the KGB vice-director A. Cvigun. Conversely, he pro-
moted to the Politburo and Secretariat positions several new generation 
communists, such as M. Gorbachev, J. Ligachev or N. Ryzhkov.
Though the Soviet ideology was never outright impugned, the new 
General Secretary began a search for new concepts relating to internal and 
12) Concept of Uskorenie i disciplina.
13) Stalinist-past legacy infl uence.
14)  For example, amnesties were not applied to political prisoners, the trials over dissidents 
went on, the emigration of Soviet Jews became more complicated.
15)  Famous Andropov’s “brain trust” which included Alexandrov-Agentov, Bovin, Volskij, and 
others.
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economic policy (apart from policies regarding discipline and order). Gorba-
chev became delegated authority over the economy and was tasked task to 
primary analysis of the state of economy (in 1983 Gorbachev-Ryzhkov group 
worked out and presented a report by the leading economic experts A. Agan-
begjan, M. Bogomolov, A. Shatalin, A. Abalkin, and N. Zaslavskaya outlining 
the situation and probable measures needed to improve the situation). The 
result of this cooperation between Party offi  cials and scientists was an “econo-
mic experiment” encompassing fi ve ministries and aimed at encouraging pro-
ducer authority by reducing the power of the central ministries’ (i.e. the num-
ber of compulsory instructions), and there were two laws introduced in July 
1983 directed at increasing the independence of producers and strengthe-
ning socialist working discipline.16 Andropov believed, that with help of the 
KGB and “healthy elements” in the Party nomenclature, he would able to ward 
off  a crisis and mobilize the society for a new wave of modernization.
It is safe to say that Andropov’s economic program did not change 
the basics of traditional socialist economy,17 which retained an emphasis on 
agriculture, despite acknowledging the need to produce enough high-quality 
consumer items. The economic experiment launched in July 1983 was sup-
posed to solve this problem and bring to the Soviet economy limited decentra-
lization and increase proportion of profi ts remaining in the hands of produ-
cers and used in accordance with the needs of local managers. According to 
this plan, by introducing a partial fi nancial incentive, it had to encourage the 
development and application of new technologies, thereby improving the pro-
ductivity of the labor force and thus freeing surplus labor for other economic 
needs. Demand for introducing tangible incentives to the economy in order to 
launch a self-regulated mechanism of raising labor productivity was tackled by 
the Law on Labor Collectives18 (involved self-management incentives for labor 
collectives as well as self-policing mechanisms). This law was also aimed at en-
couraging workers to participate in the designation of their leaders, to deci-
ding on the distribution of salaries and working tasks, although workers were 
not allowed to encroach on the authority of managerial staff . This law was sup-
posed to raise employees’ moral and discipline, as well as improve their quality 
16)  N. I. Ryzhkov in his memories named this two laws as “the beginning of Perestroika, al-
though limited by powerful ideology”; the economists working on this “new strategy” con-
tinued their work under Gorbachev too.
17) SAKWA, p. 102.
18) Russian State archive of modern history, fund 89, inventory 9, unit 124, p. 10.
of work by introducing a three-degree wage chart (which was similar to Czecho-
slovak measures from 1980). The worker moved along the chart as a function of 
his productivity, which was measured (once again) by quantitative indicators.
In agriculture, Andropov’s reforms (which were authored, applied, 
and supervised by Gorbachev) were in line with those of his predecessors, 
especially Khrushchev. These measures reverted Soviet (Russian) agricultu-
re back to the commune-style cultivation of land: a small number of families 
connected by a “collective contract” were off ered land, seeds and equipment, 
and were rewarded according to proven results, keeping an appropriate pro-
fi t based on crop production. The measures were supposed to increase the 
purchasing prices of agricultural production by 30 %, introduce purchasing 
premiums for low-profi t and unprofi table farms, and amortize or prolong 
the terms of expiration for kolkhozes’ and sovkhozes’ debts. Permitting sales 
of more agricultural products on open markets, so called Kolhoznyi rynok, 
expanded the system of cooperative trade for agricultural production. Agri-
cultural reforms likewise assumed an increase in the price for scarce com-
modities and a corresponding decrease for those of redundant items. This 
was intended to primarily encourage big state farms, i.e. sovkhozes, to spe-
cialize in the production of more profi table items.
The establishment of order and discipline across the country and in 
the production sphere deferred a number of negative processes in economy 
and temporarily increased labor productivity. The administrative measures of 
Andropov’s reforms allowed the Soviet industry to exceed the 1983 plan by 6.2 
% in agriculture by 4 %, industrial production rose by 4.7 % and labor produc-
tivity by 3.9 %19 (these fi gures were partially due to favorable weather conditi-
ons during 1983 and the immediate eff ects of the mobilization policy). 
In the second half of 1983, next portion of laws was adopted. It 
oriented at the areas such as modernization of technological level and rise of 
machines and equipment quality, improvement of population goods’ procu-
rement, development of domestic service sector, further increase of power of 
labor collectives, and adoption of the new large-scale economic experiment 
in designated industries – heavy and transport industry, electrotechnical 
branch, Ukraine’s food industry and Belorussian light industry. The typical 
features of these measures were the introduction of income incentives, and 
non-encroaching on the socialist pattern of the economy. 
19)  East European economies: slow growth in the 1980’s, United States Congress. Joint Econo-
mic Committee, Washington, DC [US] : U.S. Government printing offi  ce, 1985–1986, p. 37.
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The Resolution of Central Committee and Council of Ministers 
about the measures of acceleration of scientifi c-technological progress of Na-
tional economy was adopted on 28 August 198320 obtained the “second wave” 
of Andropov reforms. It assumed the beginning of attestation of all produ-
ced goods according to the created scale of the highest and fi rst quality 
categories:21 high-quality goods were to be sold with tangible 30 % premium 
for the producer, while the rest of goods were to be withdrawn from the mar-
ket; new State committee was entrusted with control over the process. 
Ambiguity and half-heartedness of reforms pointed out the dilem-
ma Andropov had to face: the psychological factor of the need to improve 
economic performance and, at the same time, need to preserve the “socialist 
state achievements”. It contributed to large discontent among his Party ad-
versaries and his former supporters; it did lead eventually to the deteriorati-
on of the General Secretary’s health and temporary victory of conservative 
elements headed by K. Chernenko.
The years of Andropov’s reign stressed the paradox of last years’ 
existence of the Soviet empire. There were few people in the country who 
realized that the unlimited power of Party’s General Secretary and CPSU, 
they were helpless (and aftertime hopeless) to turn the situation to the better. 
Personal interest, objective stronger socialist competition, more Central 
Committee directives, and stricter administrative sanctions could not sub-
stitute economic laws. Andropov as one of the most educated and informed 
offi  cials succumbed to the old-Leninist vision of tackling the crisis. There 
was no surprise then, that the new generation of communists represented 
by Gorbachev, Ligachev, Ryzhkov or Lukjanov had the same ideas and me-
thods how to tackle structural problems.
Providing reader with proves of the interconnection of Gorbachev’s 
Perestroika in its fi rst phase and Andropov’s reforms, is one of the tasks of 
this paper. Understanding close relation of these two politics would provide 
the reader with reasons of the popularity of Andropov and Gorbachev (in the 
fi rst phase of Perestroika),22 the late revolt against Gorbachev, and the 
policy’s failure.
20) Russian State archive of modern history, fund 89, inventory 9, units 127, p. 1.
21) The prototype of future Gospriemka system.
22)  For particular details compare the introduction speeches of Andropov (Pravda, 22 No-
vember 1982) and Gorbachev (Pravda, 14 March 1985) in: Russian State archive of modern 
history, fund 89, inventory 67, unit 20, p. 5.
Gorbachev and Andropov
Andropov is rightly considered as the fi rst high ranked offi  cial who noticed 
Gorbachev as the out of common politician and eff ective (from the Soviet point 
of view) manager. Andropov promoted Gorbachev to the position of Secretary 
of Central Committee on agriculture, extended his duties and authorities af-
ter 1982, and encouraged Gorbachev to take more active part in Politburo 
meetings to acquaint him with the work besides the agricultural sector.
The early Perestroika refl ected the ideas and traditions of Andropov’s 
time: economy reorganization, end to arms’ race (Andropov arms limitation 
off ers of 1982), denial of force in international confl icts, and achievement of 
internal transparency within the CPSU. Under Gorbachev, Perestroika was 
formulated as the “demand for greater discipline in the production process 
and measures in accordance with Leninist context” (address at the meeting 
with old guard and new generation communists23). 
The connection of early 1985–86 Gorbachev statements and 
Andropov’s policy are clearly evident after reading one of the most famous 
Andropov speeches to Politburo on 1 July 1983: “Secretariat has to concentrate 
mainly on economics. Gosplan has kept itself out of solving the most important 
questions of our economy’s development, it doesn’t display enough initiative; 
the main task is to stir up activity of Gosplan on the most important directions 
of our economy… Secondly, the harvest problem: it’s not a secret that we lose 
a great part of harvest in consequence of incompetence and inability of local 
cadres… Next question is related to control and inspection of measures’ imple-
mentation, ministries that is to say are not doing enough. To solve it we need to 
embrace my new cadres’ policy, intra-Party changes of work organization poli-
cy; to achieve that, we need to intensify our party-political work with emphasis 
on ideology, stressing our traditional, Leninist values…”24 Uskorenie concept, 
Gospriemka and “return to Lenin” as the main theses of fi rst phase Perestroi-
ka are clearly visible in this Andropov’s address to the Politburo.
Economic measures of Andropov’s policy in Perestroika are also 
clearly observed. Andropov saw the administrative, directive measures as the 
only way to accelerate economic progress. Under Gorbachev it meant that ma-
nagerial techniques were transferred from military industrial branches to 
23) Russian State archive of modern history, fund 89, inventory 61, unit 6.
24) Translation of Andropov’s address on the Politburo meeting, 1 July 1983, in: Russian Sta-
te archive of modern history, fund 89, inventory 67, unit 19.
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civil industry. Chairman of Council of ministers of USSR remembers, that the 
State committee on military-industrial complex, which included all the mini-
stries and agencies, was adopted as a model for economy’s controlling body 
(the Bureau of Council of Ministers in engineering industry, chemistry, fuel-
energy complex, social development or agricultural sector). The brightest ex-
ample of military-administrative measures’ application was creation of state 
acceptance system of industrial products (Gospriemka): functioned only in 
defense industries before, government and bureaucracy powers were then ex-
tended to consumer industries. Gorbachev application of Andropov-style re-
forms was possible only due to the support of his predecessor’s allies.25 
Signifi cant popular support and strong Party positions contributed 
to the fact, that short Andropov’s spell has left signifi cant tracks in Soviet 
people’s consciousness. Admiration and belief in authoritarian-style leader 
have long tradition in Russian history, as well as hope that the new rule could 
bring peace and order to the country. As long as Gorbachev politics and perfor-
mance satisfi ed demand for “strong leader”, communist elite and population 
supported him. But since the liberation of society and absence of fear became 
a trait of everyday life, situation got out of hand; nowadays, it is easier to under-
stand in this context the massive support of Putin’s regime in modern Russia.
Andropov’s foreign policy
To begin analysis of the other part of the paper’s task, the development of So-
viet-Czechoslovak relations in Andropov era, it is inevitable to examine and 
analyze the foreign policy of the USSR in 1982–1984. It is clear that internatio-
nal political circumstances, in most cases determine the economic conditions 
of economic cooperation and intensity of Soviet-Czechoslovak relations.
It is hard to determine the clear strategy of Andropov’s foreign po-
licy, which, as we fi nd out, mainly adapted to exterior challenges; it lacked 
understandable goals it wanted to achieve. If it is possible to determine 
Andropov’s domestic strategy (establishment of order, strict discipline), the 
complexity and large number of international confl icts led to “solve as you 
go” type of policy. The war in Afghanistan, Solidarity phenomenon in Po-
land, unsolved problems in Sino-Soviet, Japanese-Soviet relations, confl icts 
25)  Mainly former Foreign minister and now Chairman of Presidium of Supreme Soviet A. A. 
Gromyko.
in the Middle East, Ethiopia, in the South of Africa, worsening relations with 
Western Europe, and the USA – those are just the most acute problems Andro-
pov had to face on the international scene. 
In Andropov’s “Selected speeches and articles”, published in 1983, 
we fi nd the explanation of principles General Secretary was led by in his 
formulation of the Soviet foreign policy. In the article “Leninism – the sci-
ence and art of revolution’s creativity”, we fi nd out that “Our policy is in its 
essence and according to its targets is a class policy; class approach is our 
dominant guided principle, its framework is determined by the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union”.26 The class approach doomed Soviet economy to 
never ending confrontation, fi ght to exhaustion, denying any possibility of 
concession to class enemy. During his fi fteen months reign, Andropov was 
unable to return to pre-1979 Brezhnev’s détente; class thinking dictated fi ght 
for sustainment of nuclear parity and achievement of advantages at the ex-
pense of opposing side at any price (“zero sum” strategy).
Sustainment of Brezhnev’s nuclear parity achieved in the end of 
1970’s was eventually one of the goals of Andropov’s political representation. 
It was done with just one intention: as long as the Soviets were able to keep 
the achieved degree of militarization, the country had strong bargaining 
position in the world confrontation with the West. Andropov understood 
that the Soviet nuclear weapons and the Red Army were the only means that 
sustained USSR’s superpower position (the Soviet Union was commonly 
called in diplomatic circles as Upper Volta with rockets27). The same charac-
teristics were applied for the US-Soviet relations in Brezhnev’s era, but the 
new American president, strongly anti-communist Ronald Reagan adhered 
to a policy of combating communism: clearly formulated his stance to the 
USSR28 and denounced policy of “nuclear appeasement” (program of SDI). 
26) J. V. ANDROPOV, Selected speeches and articles, Moscow 1983.
27) MEDVEDEV, Andropov, p.142.
28)  Reagan’s March 8, 1983 speech to the National Association of Evangelicals in Orlando, 
Florida: “So, in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals, I urge you to beware the 
temptation of pride, the temptation of blithely declaring yourselves above it all and label 
both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an 
evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant misunderstanding and thereby remove 
yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil”, in: President Ro-
nald Reagan: Evil Empire speech, available at: http://www.commandposts.com/2011/03/
president-ronald-reagan-evil-empire-speech/, [cit. 12 April 2011].
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Further aggravation of international political situation, sharpening 
of Soviet-American rhetoric, and extended confrontation of two ideologically op-
posed camps happened in September 1983 after an incident that changed the 
commercial aviation industry, when the South Koreans airlines’ Boeing was shot 
down above the Sea of Okhotsk. Primarily, the Soviet offi  cials29 didn’t admit to 
their actions; only after a week of denials and false press conferences, the Pravda 
newspaper printed an address of Politburo with condolences over “the death of 
innocent people”. Infl uence of this incident to the Soviet reputation was immen-
se, comparable probably to the Afghanistan war; it led to further strengthening 
of Euro-communism platform in Western Europe, rising discontent with Soviet 
presence in some parts of the planet, increased support for the new American 
policy’s stance toward the Soviet camp and the Soviet Union’s strategy.
The USSR’s deployment of intermediate-range modernized rok-
kets30 (NATO signature – SS-20) targeting the Western part of the continent 
was another famous aff air of Andropov’s era. It caused a growing alarm in 
NATO and the USA and led to the installment of Pershing II missiles and ne-
wly developed cruise missiles (predominantly on the West-German soil). 
This missiles’ deployment in the Federal republic of Germany had 
very signifi cant moral, national and psychological aspect for the Soviet Uni-
on, particularly after Social democrats (SPD) were defeated in the German 
elections of 1983, which explain non-symmetrical answer measures the USSR 
came up with. It aimed at the “renewal of breached strategic parity” which 
included: deployment of more accurate tactical nuclear missiles in GDR and 
Czechoslovakia, construction of new bases in Chukotka region for intermedi-
ate-range missiles, walkout from the negotiations on the limitation of nuclear 
weapons in Europe, and cancellation of moratorium on deployment of new 
long-range nuclear missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union. 
New wave of arms race had considerable consequences not only to 
the foreign-policy agenda, but to the economy as well. Now, the deterioration 
of economic problems of Soviet satellites, including Czechoslovakia, rose as 
the other problem for Andropov. Worsening of economic performance regi-
29)  At this time, Andropov was in the hospital; Chernenko and Ustinov were in charge of Po-
litburo meetings.
30)  The deployment of new missiles was reasoned by the Soviet offi  cials with modernization 
of old SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, although USSR substituted the old missiles in relation 1:1, 
the new SS-20 obtained a multi-warhead system instead of just one warhead installed in 
SS-4 and SS-5 systems.
stered in Czechoslovakia aggravated problems that began back in the Sixth 
fi ve-year plan years. The slowing-down of economic growth31 displayed by 
qualitative and quantitative indicators, thoroughly infl uenced the compila-
tion of seventh fi ve-year plan.32
The renewed arms race negatively infl uenced the Socialist bloc’s 
economics. The list of social benefi ts has never been extended; the plan-
ners’ aim was to keep consumer standard and ensure suffi  cient supply of 
existed demand. These measures did reduce poverty, but generally led to 
the lower living standards.33
Economic diffi  culties of satellites extended their ever growing de-
pendence on the Soviet economy. The USSR had to spend more hard currency 
to subsidize its ineff ective economies. The dependence manifested in the gro-
wing numbers of imports from Comecon countries to the Soviet Union (64 % 
of imports of investment goods in 1984 from Czechoslovakia headed for the 
Soviet market) was characteristic after 1982. The case of Czechoslovakia and 
Soviet-Czechoslovak economic relations and cooperation, and its development 
in the 1982–1984 period, is the subject of the next part of the paper.
Soviet-Czechoslovak trade, economic and technological cooperation
After the analysis of impacts the new General Secretary’s ideological, econo-
mic and foreign policy had on domestic Soviet scene, we turn our attention 
to the bilateral relations with Czechoslovakia. 
Andropov continued in the footsteps of his predecessor: his stra-
tegy was dominated by Brezhnev’s doctrine in political sphere and exclusi-
ve economic orientation on the Soviet market in the economy, although 
some new elements are present, such as intensifi cation programs, Comecon 
specialization programs, and increased intensity of joint investment pro-
grams. To analyze relations, we would concentrate to the following areas of 
cooperation: trade, bilateral investment activities, scientifi c and technolo-
gical cooperation. It will allow to summon up the results and outline trends 
31)  For more data about Czechoslovak growth in the 1981–1983, see East European economies: 
slow growth in the 1980’s, United States Congress. Joint Economic Committee, Washing-
ton, DC [US]: U.S. Government printing offi  ce, 1985–1986, p. 42.
32) Russian State archive of modern history, fund 89, inventory 67, unit 20, p.5.
33) K. DURMAN, Útěk od praporů. Kreml a krize impéria 1964–1991, Prague 1998.
182
wbhr 02|2011
183
Andropov’s “Perestroika” and Soviet-Czechoslovak relations in 1982–1984 | Timur Kashapov
characteristic for the Soviet-Czechoslovak relations in 1982-1984 period 
(longer 1980-1985 cycle is examined for the purpose of putting new trends 
into the context and presenting reader with the economic picture of the 
Soviet and Czechoslovak relation development).
Bilateral relations were considerably infl uenced by set of pro-
blems Czechoslovak economy had to face. First, necessity to deal with in-
fl uence of world „price explosion” to the domestic economy: the level of 
import prices grew by 54 % (1975–1982), whilst population’s living costs 
grew by only 1 %,34 in 1970–1980 period the average prices of CSSR’s export 
grew by 60 %, but imports’ prices rose by 95 %, thereby terms of trade wor-
sened by 18 %.35 In consequence, elevated incomes achieved by rise of vo-
lume of exports still were not enough to pay for imported goods.36 Due to 
rise of prices, Czechoslovakia had to increase exports by 10% of industrial 
items in physical terms to the USSR in 1975, than in the year 1970, 22 % 
more in 1980, 35–40 % in 1983–1984. This led to forced acceleration of ex-
ports (by 22.3 % in 1981–1985 period) in compare with 2%37 growth in 
physical terms of Soviet imports. 
Czechoslovakian planners tried to deal with unfavorable balance 
of payments in bilateral trade with the USSR with increased eff ort to export 
more machines, equipment and consumer products to the Soviet Union. The 
policy had the following consequences for CSSR’s economic structure: 
1.  eff orts to level balance of payments by mobilization of domestic reserves 
of Czechoslovak economy and search for additional export funds led to 
elevated investment expenditures, transfer of funds to prioritized sectors 
of the system (thus shortage for other purposes); 
2.  changed proportion of exported/imported machines (2:1 in 1975 to 4:1 in 
1985) negatively eff ected intensifi cation eff orts undertaken in the 1980–1983 
period, therefore aff ecting CSSR engagement in socialist integration process; 
34)  V. PRŮCHA, Hospodářské a sociální dějiny Československa 1918–1992, 2.díl, Praha 2009.
35)  National Archive, Central Committee archive fund (1984), signature P111/84, unit 6957, p.6.
36)  It is important to mention that Czechoslovakia‘s terms of trade, i.e. export prices, were 
also infl uenced by low quality of exported goods, therefore low prices they were sold for 
on the world market.
37)  V. DANSHINA, Ekonomika Chechoslovakii v 80-e gody, Moscow 2003.
3.  eff orts to increase production and exports of machines and equipment led 
to neglect of quality in R&D area (generally characteristic for industrially 
advanced Eastern bloc’ countries);
4.  decreased imports of Soviet consumer goods and food due to worsened 
trade terms infl uenced supply of Czechoslovak domestic market;
5.  further forced industrialization (to export more goods) limited the develo-
pment and modernization of industrial base, weakened consumer produ-
cts’ competitiveness.
Derived extensive dependence on foreign trade with the Soviet Union was 
natural consequence of described trends, and the small size of Czechoslova-
kian domestic market. In the period of 1982 to 1984, CSSR’s close attachment 
to the Soviet economy deepened even further due to technological revolution 
in the West, which considerably limited the access of the Czechoslovak go-
ods’ exports to the Western European markets. 
Share of trade article in overall exports of Czechoslovakia to the USSR (%)
Item 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Machines, equipment, transport vehicles 46,9 49,1 50,8 53,2 53,0
Fuel, raw materials 23,5 24,4 24,8 23,2 22,7
Chemical agents, fertilizers, rubber 20,9 22,0 20,0 21,3 21,6
Building materials 17,8 24,4 23,8 26,4 30,7
Non-feed raw materials 4,9 6,8 5,2 6,4 6,5
Live animals 1,0 2,1 4,9 4,5 5,5
Feed raw materials 15,4 48,9 28,5 16,6 13,2
Food 20,8 25,9 24,6 28,2 33,0
Consumer industrial goods 43,4 47,4 48,4 50,0 50,9
Source: J. FINGERLAND, Národohospodářský komplex SSSR a československo-sovětská 
spolupráce, Praha 1989, p. 146.
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Share of article in overall imports of Czechoslovakia from the USSR (%)
Item 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Machines, equipment, transport vehicles 24,3 25,2 27,4 27,6 25,9
Fuel, raw materials 73,2 77,8 79,2 80,6 81,7
Chemical agents, fertilizers, rubber 16,9 18,3 18,6 21,3 22,3
Building materials 6,5 7,7 4,6 5,5 5,2
Non-feed raw materials 16,8 19,4 19,9 20,2 20,3
Live animals 6,5 6,5 4,9 6,2 6,8
Feed raw materials 0,6 1,1 1,4 1,1 1,0
Food 5,9 6,6 6,7 5,9 6,0
Consumer industrial goods 10,1 9,3 10,4 11,2 8,3
Source: J. FINGERLAND, Národohospodářský komplex SSSR a československo-sovětská 
spolupráce, Praha 1989, p. 147.
Shares of particular articles in indicated period copied long-term trends of 
Soviet-Czechoslovak trade, although the interdependence of both econo-
mies did rise primarily due to external factors (price factor), rather than as 
a consequence of growing intensity of mutual trade. Steadily growing Cze-
choslovak dependence on the Soviet market had negative long-term im-
pacts on CSSR’s economy: guaranteed sales on the Soviet market led to sys-
tematic decline of technological level, machinery industry oriented 
economy produced about 90%38 of branch’s nomenclature, absence of com-
petition and income-driven motivation led to stagnation of managerial 
and working cadres; on the other side, guaranteed full-employment system 
helped to avoid large manifestations of popular discontent and contribu-
ted to preservation of social calm.
Let’s now take a look at the mere structure of Czechoslovak-Soviet 
trade. The data displayed in Tables the Soviet imports from the CSSR and 
Structure of Czechoslovak import from the USSR gives us an image of bilate-
ral trade structure in 1981 to 1985 period.
38) O. TUREK, Podíl ekonomiky na pádu komunismu, Praha 1995, p. 10.
Soviet trade with Czechoslovakia 1980–1983 (millions of rubles)
(current rubles) 1980 1981 1982 1983
exports 3648 4382 5048 5872
imports 3536 4105 4732 5420
trade balance 112 277 316 452
(constant rubles) 1980 1981 1982 1983
exports – 3810 3883 4092
imports – 3783 4097 4425
trade balance – 27 -314 -333
Source: East European economies: slow growth in the 1980’s, United States Congress. 
Joint Economic Committee, Washington, DC [US]: U.S. Government printing offi  ce, 
1985–1986, p. 32.
The Soviet imports from the CSSR (%)
item 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Machines, equipment, transport vehicles 64,5 63,5 66,4 68,3 68,3
Fuel, raw materials 9,3 8,8 8,4 7,3 7,3
Chemical agents, fertilizers, rubber 3,1 3,1 2,8 2,7 2,8
Building materials 1,1 1,4 1,3 1,5 1,5
Non-feed raw materials 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,5
Live animals – – – – –
Feed raw materials 0,3 1,5 0,5 0,2 0,2
Food 1,7 1,4 1,2 1,5 1,6
Consumer industrial goods 19,3 19,6 18,8 17,9 18,2
Source: J. FINGERLAND, Národohospodářský komplex SSSR a československo-sovětská 
spolupráce, 1989, p. 142.
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Structure of Czechoslovak import from the USSR (%) 
item 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Machines, equipment, transport vehicles 20,8 18,9 19,4 19,7 18,6
Fuel, raw materials 69,4 72,5 72,5 72,3 73,4
Chemical agents, fertilizers, rubber 3,8 3,3 3,1 3,2 3,4
Building materials 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
Non-feed raw materials 3,6 3,2 2,9 2,9 2,8
Live animals – – – – –
Feed raw materials 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1
Food 0,8 0,7 0,6 0,5 0,6
Consumer industrial goods 1,4 1,2 1,3 1,3 1,1
Source: J. FINGERLAND, Národohospodářský komplex SSSR a československo-sovětská 
spolupráce, Praha 1989, p. 144.
The 1982–1984 years’ proportion of exports comprised traditionally of ma-
chines and equipment (reached about two thirds of the overall exports), the 
second decisive aggregation was deliveries of wide range consumer industri-
al products on the Soviet market. Imports from the Soviet Union were com-
posed of fuels and raw materials deliveries, metals, machines, equipment 
and transport vehicles.
Other aggregations occupied second-rate positions and make up 
only 30 % of the USSR-CSSR trade, despite the fact that their dynamics of ex-
porting volumes are much higher during this period. It applied to Czecho-
slovakian exports of building materials and spare parts, feed raw materials 
(malting barley and hops), food (dominated by meat and meat preparations, 
beer, butter, confectionery), and industrial consumer products (footwear,39 
leather haberdashery, glass tableware, bijouterie)40 and particular Soviet 
39)  Special position in the Soviet-Czechoslovak trade is occupied by the CSSR’s shoe export: 
600 million pairs of shoes was regularly delivered on the Soviet market (98 % of the 
CSSR’s shoe export), in: National Archive, Central Committee archive fund (1983), signatu-
re P65/83, unit 4042, p. 2.
40)  One of the typical distribution methods to elevate sales of Czechoslovak goods in the So-
viet Union was construction of highly tailored shops in the largest Soviet cities, for ex-
ample “Praga” supermarket in Moscow district Chertanovo with turnover of 85 million of 
Rubles a year specialized in Czechoslovakian consumer products, it was opened in 1981.
exports of chemical consumer industry products, fertilizers, rubber, synthe-
tic fi bers, food, industrial consumer products (household appliance, music 
and record players, TV sets). 
Continuing trend of pre-Andropov period of fuel for machines 
based principle in the bilateral trade is explained not only by continuing (in 
Andropov’s era) industrialization process which stimulated mutual exchange 
in these sectors, but also their rising importance for the Czechoslovakia as its 
medium of payment for Soviet imports of fuel and raw materials.41
Thereby, the deliveries of the Soviet fuel and raw materials occu-
pied the most important role. The Soviet Union satisfi ed the larger part of 
Czechoslovakia’s import needs; Soviet deliveries of raw materials and semi-
fi nished goods satisfi ed more than half of its demand, in particular (1983):42 
oil (93 %), iron ore (83 %), natural gas (100 %), asbestos (76 %), black coal (69 %), 
black rolled metal (100 %), cast iron (94 %), manganese ore (100 %), cotton 
(69 %). The Soviet Union was the supplier of many embargoed raw materials 
such as chrome, copper, nickel, aluminum, sulfuric acid and others. The 
fuels (in nominal prices) composed 72 % of Soviet exports to the CSSR in 
1984; to secure stable and low-cost fuel, energy and raw materials deliveries 
Czechoslovakia took part in investment ventures on the Soviet territory, not 
only in the energy sector.
The most common case of this type of cooperation was participa-
tion on projects of oil and gas pipeline construction, for example gas pipe-
line Soyuz built in the years 1978–1982. This pipeline transported gas 
from Orenburg region to six Comecon countries: according to plan the 
second longest section from Volgograd to Russian borders was constructed 
and fi nanced by Czechoslovakia (2000 Czechoslovakian specialists took 
part in project); participation in this project ensured the deliveries of 2.8 
billions m3 of gas each year.43 After the Soyuz pipeline, Czechoslovakia 
(together with other Comecon countries) participated in the Urengoj-Uzh-
41)  Sharpened by the growing prices of oil and other raw materials in the second half of 
1970’s and in the 1980’s after two oil shocks, which hit the socialist system with a couple 
of years delay thanks to the running average price system in the Comecon trade.
42)  Data from Vneshnyaya torgovlya Sovetskogo Sojuza v 1989 godu, Gosstat, Moscow, 1989 
and Statistická ročenka 1989, CSU, Prague 1990.
43)  Economics’ department of the State Archive of the Russian Federation, fund 302, invento-
ry 2, signature 302/2/V, unit 1956, p. 41.
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gorod pipeline and maintenance complex construction for the transit 
pipeline in Uzhgorod.
Investment ventures to satisfy energy demand were applied in 
other sectors as well. Very active Soviet-Czechoslovak cooperation developed 
in atomic energy sphere (the construction of nuclear power station in 
Chmelnice and later in Temelín).44 Czechoslovakia participated on the crea-
tion of the world’s biggest electro energy system Mir (connected Comecon 
countries energy systems).
Soviet fuels and raw materials were also imported in exchange for 
the participation of Czechoslovakia in construction of mining and proces-
sing capacities: deliveries of iron ore were secured by funding of ore mining 
in Kursk and Donetsk region. In accordance with the agreement from Octo-
ber 1983 Czechoslovakia (along with GDR and Romania) participated in buil-
ding the Krivoj Rog plant meant for mining and enrichment of iron and 
magnesium ore.45
Deliveries of other raw materials were secured by fi nancial and 
technical participation in investment projects on the Soviet territory, 
such as production of ferroalloy (in Ukraine and Kazakhstan), mining of 
asbestos (in Orenburg region), production of cellulose (in Irkutsk region), 
fodder yeast (in Ukraine), ammophos (construction of “Fosforit” plant in 
Estonia), mining of ironstone shale (Kimbaevsk plant for processing of 
ferroalloys).46
The need to secure the Soviet deliveries of minerals favored the 
development of bilateral and multilateral socialist cooperation in energy 
sector. Andropov’s „administration“, although followed old tradition, was 
trying to extend the range of projects in this sector; eff ectively this policy 
led to deeper and closer integration of particular economies.
Czechoslovak deliveries of machines and equipment occupied 
equally important place in CSSR’s exports, as fuel exports for USSR.
44)  National Archive, Central Committee archive fund (1984), signature P111/84, unit 6957, p. 5.
45)  Czechoslovakian specialists constructed the hall of magnetic separation and its material 
equipment.
46)  Economics’ department of the State Archive of the Russian Federation, fund 2, inventory 
1, signature 413/32/2, unit 1601, p. 5.
Czechoslovak-Soviet machines and equipment trade in 1985 
(million Czechoslovak crowns)
subsector Export Import
Investment unit, complete industrial plant 6899 833
Energy machines 889 1150
Machines for heavy industry 5822 1227
Machines for processing industries 8626 434
Machines for agriculture, trade and services 1786 602
Transport vehicles for production needs 10280 335
Transport vehicles for personal needs 1108 827
Fine mechanics and optics goods for production needs 1307 188
Fine mechanics goods for personal needs 59 115
Indicators, gauges and tools 65 74
Overall 38840 5786
Source: B. A. SHMELEV, Centralno-Vostochnaja Evropa vo vtoroi polovine XX.veka, vol. 2, 
Moscow 2002, p. 79.
The leading subsectors of machines and equipment exports’ industry were 
transport vehicles, complete industrial plant units and heavy-industry ma-
chines, and its growing meaning for satisfaction of the CSSR’s and the Soviet 
economy extensive growth pressed for increase in its production. 
This brings us to one of the most important features of Andropov’s 
1982–1984 period cooperation, which is the Soviet increased emphasize of 
the Program of socialist intrasectoral division of labor application, which 
was applied in order to increase mutual trade, especially in processing and 
machinery industries. 
On the base of the Table of Czechoslovak-Soviet trade with machi-
nes and equipment in 1985, we can analyze the infl uence of the Program 
on machinery industry trade structure. The signs of achieving certain de-
gree of intrasectoral division of labor are noticeable for example in energy 
machinery subsector (Czechoslovakia exported cylinder engines and ener-
gy equipment for power stations, imported equipment for nuclear plants), 
transport vehicles for personal needs subsector (CSSR’s exports were com-
posed of motorcycles, Soviet cars were imported), and fi ne mechanics and 
optics goods subsector. 
Andropov’s “Perestroika” and Soviet-Czechoslovak relations in 1982–1984 | Timur Kashapov
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The same data for trade with chemical industry products can be found in:
The 1984 Soviet-Czechoslovak chemical industry items trade 
(million Czechoslovak Crowns) 
Subsector Export Import
Chemical raw materials mining 0 185
Basic chemistry 1502 2220
Chemical production 382 30
Pharmaceutics production 758 130
Rubber-asbestos products 345 42
Synthetic fi ber and plastic materials 352 216
Oil-refi ned products 49 1066
Overall 2941 3896
Source: B. A. SHMELEV, Centralno-Vostochnaja Evropa vo vtoroi polovine XX.veka, vol. 2, 
Moscow 2002, p. 80.
Chemical industry is mostly mentioned as the example of the best applicati-
on of division labor principle in Soviet-Czechoslovak trade. It was the result 
of 1983 Agreement on specialization application in production of energy in-
tensive and less-energy intensive articles. In compliance with this agreement 
the Soviet Union increased exports of high-pressure polyethylene, methanol, 
nitrogen fertilizers, and synthetic rubber; Czechoslovakia exported chemi-
cal reagents, chemical additives, and paint and varnish industry products. 
The most developed degree of intrasectoral cooperation is evident in synthe-
tic fi bers and plastic materials subsector, basic chemistry subsector. 
Next table accounts the general eff ects of application of the Pro-
gram in the rest of economic sector of the USSR-CSSR trade.
Rate of changes in intrasectoral Soviet-Czechoslovakian trade 
(million Czechoslovak crowns)
Sector Year Import Export Balance Share in 
overall 
imports
Share in 
overall 
exports
Agriculture 1981 31 217 +186 0,066 0,513
1985 37 198 +161 0,054 0,310
Fuels 1981 26867 32 -26835 57,9 0,075
1985 46518 21 -46947 66,8 0,033
Energy sector 1981 651 126 -524 1,4 0,299
1985 1387 152 -1235 2,0 0,238
Ferrous metallurgy 1981 4301 2290 -2011 9,4 5,4
1985 4479 2294 -2184 6,5 3,6
Nonferrous metallurgy 1981 2125 3 -2122 4,6 0,007
1985 2470 81 -2388 3,5 0,127
Chemical and rubber industry 1981 3123 2215 -907 7,1 5,2
1985 3896 2941 -954 5,7 4,6
Machinery 1981 4549 23349 +18930 9,9 55,3
1985 5799 36661 +31054 8,3 57,5
Electrotechnical sector 1981 1221 2709 +1488 2,7 6,4
1985 1522 4672 +3150 2,2 7,3
Building materials industry 1981 131 279 +149 0,289 0,662
1985 134 625 +491 0,192 0,980
Wood-processing industry 1981 257 938 +681 0,554 2,2
1985 251 1536 +1285 0,360 2,4
Metalworking industry 1981 228 412 +184 0,974 0,491
1985 293 819 +526 1,3 0,420
Paper, cellulose 1981 506 35 -471 1,091 0,083
1985 599 60 -539 0,861 0,093
Glassware and stoneware industry 1981 35 814 +778 0,076 1,926
1985 53 906 +853 0,076 1,421
Textile industry 1981 893 1545 +652 1,925 3,657
1985 1167 1550 +1383 1,675 4,001
Ready-made industry 1981 0,95 1466 +1466 0 3,5
1985 0 2220 +2220 0 3,5
Printing industry 1981 55 74 +19 0,117 1,158
1985 57 172 +114 0,082 0,256
Food-processing industry 1981 475 685 +210 1,030 1,617
1985 485 1287 +801 0,698 2,014
Other industrial products 1981 485 305 -179 1,044 0,722
1985 176 425 +249 0,253 0,666
Building production 1981 35 819 +784 0,074 1,934
1985 9 1747 +1738 0,015 2,719
Overall 1981 46118 42429 -3689 100,0 100,0
1985 69440 63157 -5483 100,0 100,0
Source: Interní statistický materiál FMZO – Praha, 1986.
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Table data clearly demonstrates limited eff ects the mentioned Program had 
on the CSSR-USSR trade; the majority of trade was executed in the framework 
of intersectoral exchange, except chemical and partly machinery industry, 
which led to stagnation and extensive-style growth of existing structure of 
bilateral cooperation and trade. 
Tables’ content proves the inability of Czechoslovak and Soviet plan-
ners to develop deeper socialist integration in intrasectoral division of labor. Its 
character in machinery industry shows that Czechoslovakian economy conti-
nued processing of increasingly expensive raw materials transported on long 
distances, producing standard old-style machines and equipment, competitive 
only in socialist Bloc; at the same time prices, achieved by selling it on the world 
market decreased47. The analysis of trade structure confi rms that trade pattern 
of fuels and raw materials for machinery production still dominated the trade 
of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union in the 1982–1984 Andropov’s period.
We now turn our attention to other spheres of bilateral cooperati-
on. It is necessary to take a closer look at the Soviet-Czechoslovak cooperati-
on in other areas, such as specialization agreements, which were widely used 
in the fi rst half of the 1980’s, then scientifi c-technological cooperation, and 
joint investment construction projects.
Generally, the bilateral specialization and cooperation agreements 
were mainly applied to the areas, where the Soviet bloc’s countries lagged be-
hind the West, let’s only mention some of them: Soviet-Czechoslovak coopera-
tion agreement on development of machinery tools, automation engineering 
tools, industrial robots and manipulators, creation of unifi ed components 
base of electrotechnical articles, computers, industrial cooperation on deve-
lopment and production of equipment for metallurgy and agriculture machi-
nery, establishment of complementary production of electrotechnical, fi lling, 
compressing and cooling equipment, construction of rail-borne vehicles and 
ships, already mentioned agreement on chemical industry specialization48.
Although the eff orts to reach progress in particular sectors were 
large, anticipated results in compare to targets didn’t eventually arrive. The 
analysis of particular agreements49 may explain why the outcome lagged 
behind high expectations of the Soviet and Czechoslovak planners:
47) For further details see table East European economies: slow growth in the 1980’s, p 41.
48)  National Archive, Central Committee archive fund (1985), signature P131/85, unit 8601, p.10.
49)  In particular, agreements on cooperation in heavy and machinery industries, as leading 
and prioritized branches.
–  the fi rst reason is superiority of specialization side of cooperation, emphasi-
ze of parallel, co-productive elements production in spite of complementary 
elements; weakly developed node and spare parts specialization; thereby 
never reached satisfactory level of intrasectoral cooperation;
–  secondly, producers’ lacked material incentives for participation in process 
of establishing closer specialization and co-operational links, for exchange 
of knowledge and know-how with opposite side;
–  at last, inability to improve quality and technological level of cooperated 
production, especially machinery industry production (low share of new 
products in bilateral trade) caused by complicated organizational structu-
re, which supplied connection between particular plants and research 
workplaces.
The highest party offi  cials and planners knew the reasons and actual state of 
cooperation. Andropov was acquainted with the actual state of relations 
with the satellites. The reaction to these problems was creation of another 
bureaucratic bodies, namely Intergovernmental committee on economic co-
operation50 in December 1982, which tackled the problems by new directi-
ves, i.e. extended control of agreements implementation, exchange of specia-
lists, establishment of new links at the governmental military ministries’ 
level (the decentralization process was never considered an option).
The scientifi c-technological cooperation (STC) of the USSR and CSSR 
was, on the other side, one of the more intensive and developed sectors of 
bilateral relations. Well-founded and intense character of relations in this 
sector is confi rmed by high number of patents registered by the Czechoslova-
kia and the USSR in the fi rst half of 1980’s.
The new base for cooperation in Andropov’s period was defi ned by 
the Concept51 of scientifi c-technological cooperation till year 2000 and Pro-
gram for further development and increase of eff ectiveness of cooperation 
between the CSSR and the USSR in priority areas of research and develop-
ment52 adopted in December 1982. The institutional base for this sector of 
cooperation was also provided by a number of further agreements, directed 
50)  In Czech: Mezivládní československo-sovětská komise pro hospodářskou a vědeckotech-
nockou spolupráci.
51)  Koncepciya nauchno-technicheskogo sotrudnichestva do 2000 goda.
52)  Program called Mery po dalneishemu razvitiyu a povysheniyu eff ektivnosti sotrudnich-
estva CHSSR i SSSR v prioritetnych oblastyach nauki i techniki.
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at the areas, such as economic and rational use of fuels and raw materials, 
protection of environment, development of automatic robots and manipula-
tors for diff erent economic branches, chemicalization and biochemicalizati-
on of agricultural production etc. 
18 priority areas of cooperation (subprograms) were set according 
to the Program and Concept of cooperation till year 2000. Let’s now take 
a closer look at the level and results of bilateral cooperation of two countries 
in defi ned period. The more successful are examples of STC priority tasks’ 
realization (1982–1985)53 in: 
–  cooperation on creation of robots and manipulators for processing termi-
nals and welding plant maintenance, for junction welding, installation 
operations, and foundry under pressure processes (the production of these 
robots was carried out on the Czechoslovak factories);
–  spindle winding machine technology and BDA-14 automatic weaving loom;
–  continuous cast technology; 
–  creation and production of low-tonnage chemical articles54;
–  vulcanization acceleration technology developed in the CSSR and applied 
in the Soviet service sector;
–  creation of drift miner complex used for tunnel building in the Soviet Union;
–  creation and use of robots serving the needs of factories and processes of 
electrotechnical industry, development of electronic devices.
Czechoslovakia had primary role in light industry sector; one of the most 
successful examples of cooperation between the Soviet and Czechoslovak 
scientists was the creation of spinning machine BD (produced in the CSSR),55 
in accordance with the 1983 Agreement, Czechoslovakia participated on the 
light industry factories modernization: Erevan tannery, Voroshilovgrad shoe 
factory, Vladimir leather factory, Moscow “Burevestnik” factory, or Narva le-
ather factory (its alone satisfi ed 12% of the Soviet need in leather) were com-
pletely re-built or modernized by Czechoslovakian specialists, or equipped 
by Czechoslovakian equipment. 
53)  National Archive, Central Committee archive fund (1984), signature P101/84, unit 6103, 
p. 20.
54)  This particular program was exclusively fi nanced by the International investment bank 
– a unique form of research support in the Socialist bloc.
55) 20 % of the Soviet clothing industry factories were equipped with this machine.
In chemical consumer industry in accordance with the Agreement 
on scientifi c-technological cooperation for the creation of new chemical con-
sumer products, the Comecon production lines for the production of washing 
and cleaning agents were installed on „Rakona“ factory in Czechoslovakia 
and „Litbytchim“ factory in Volgograd. In cooperation with Czechoslovak en-
terprise “Spolana” the Uzhgorod and Simferopol chemical plants were equip-
ped with new conveyors. “Sojuzbytchim” and the Czechoslovak fat industry 
factories cooperated on construction of Brezhnev (Naberezhnye Chelny) fac-
tory on production of goods for industrial needs of the Soviet economy.
Under the agreements on scientifi c-technological documentation 
exchange (1985 data),56 Czechoslovakia transferred more than 200 projects 
of industrial plants and factories construction: Dmitrov beer producing 
plant, Saransk sugar processing factory, Bednodemyanovsk dairy factory 
etc. Rubber plant in Kralupy-na-Vltavě, synthetic fi ber production plant in 
Humen, peniciline factory Slovenska Lupcha, sulfuric acid production line 
on „Slovnaft“ plant in Bratislava etc., were built in accordance with the 
Soviet projects during the same period (more than 300 transferred design-
driven documents).
The rising number of theoretical inventions and technological me-
thods and procedures didn’t though fi nd enough application in real econo-
my, nor did it elevate industrial technological level or consumer production 
quality. The comparison of content of STC and accomplished results off ered 
for practical adoption of new technologies indicates the missing link in so-
cialist economy, which led to gradual lagging behind the Western world 
(commonly considered to be around 30 to 40 years).57 STC tasks were depri-
ved of tools for successive transfer from development to production; the re-
sults of joint research eff orts rarely became the subject of international spe-
cialization and cooperation, the export articles in bilateral trade or with 
third countries; the reasons for that were multiple:
–  evident isolation between R&D planning and production planning, lack of 
research and specialization interconnection;
56)  Economics’ department of the State Archive of the Russian Federation, fund 2, inventory 
1, signature 413/32/2, unit 1602, p. 3.
57)  Offi  cially admitted level of backwardness by the CPSU, in: Economics’ department of the 
State Archive of the Russian Federation, fund 302, inventory 2, signature 302/2/V, unit 
1981, p. 5.
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–  clear inequality of R&D results transfer between the Soviet Union and the 
CSSR (only 16 % of Czechoslovakian patents were transferred to the USSR 
through foreign-trade organization, i.e. was paid for);
–  long-lasting development and production preparations, moral and techno-
logical obsolescence in the sales’ phase;
–  lack of incentives from research institutions to innovate in consequence of 
equalitarian rewards system of the institutions and its employees;
–  low-level specialization, multiproduct production (CSSR produced 90 % of 
machinery industry goods), thereby inability to sustain high level of com-
petitiveness of all articles;
–  insuffi  cient level of coordination of bilateral R&D cooperation, i.e. duplica-
tion of research projects by same-branch institutions and organizations;
–  uncoordinated purchases of licenses and patents from third countries led 
to ineff ective and excessive expenditures;
–  insuffi  cient producers demand, i.e. absence of external incentives in conse-
quence of inexistent income motive for innovation;
–  weak dependence of R&D institutions on success of research projects imple-
mentation and stability of consumers’ demand for new product.
Due to this reasons, the share of science intensive production in bilateral tra-
de was gradually decreasing: for example, in 1984 it occupied only 5 % of the 
Soviet exports to the CSSR, and 12 % in other direction58. During the fi rst half 
of the 1980’s this number steadily decreased, the technological level of the 
Soviet and Czechoslovak productive base stagnated59. To understand the qua-
lity of goods produced in two countries in compare with the world market le-
vel we need to take a look at the kg/price index of westward exported goods: in 
1970 kg/price of machinery production (primary export article) made up 40 
to 50 % of the world level, in 1980 30 to 35 %, less than 25 % in 1984.60
In spite of high intensity of joint investment construction during 
analyzed period, its content and problems were no diff erent in compare with 
other areas of bilateral cooperation: emphasis on securing primary produc-
tion commodities – fuels, energy and raw materials (due to high investment 
58)  SSSR-CHSSR: nauchno-proizvodstvennaya integraciya i intensifi kaciya, Sbornik statei, 
Moscow, 1989.
59)  National Archive, Central Committee archive fund (1984), signature P110/84, unit 6836, p. 7.
60)  B. A. SHMELEV, Centralno-Vostochnaja Evropa vo vtoroi polovine XX.veka, vol. 2, Moscow 
2002, p. 202.
intensity of these branches, irregular dislocation of mining facilities and 
persisting economic growth based on extensive factors), weak growth of pro-
cessing industries’ facilities construction (therefore, slowdown of scientifi c-
technological progress), neglect in application of environmentally friendly 
technologies in joint projects.
Conclusion
Jury Andropov came to power in November 1982, on the verge of stagnation-
zastoi period. His reign is widely perceived only as the transitional period 
from Brezhnev to Gorbachev, neglecting the fact that his brief power spell 
strongly infl uenced the country, and people’s mind. His politics inspired the 
next generation of communists to begin changing process after 1985 in the 
framework of Perestroika reforms. Andropov was typical representative of 
the Soviet system; he participated on its formation in Brezhnev era as the 
KGB Director. Although he was not going to undermine the power and social 
basis of communist power (and never aspired to do that), Andropov’s reforms 
eventually changed the style and nature of country’s management. 
Andropov’s “version” of Perestroika, in its essence, was an attempt 
of people devoted to command Soviet system, to achieve its sterility. In reali-
ty, it only confi rmed the assertion that it could eff ectively function and evol-
ve only under totalitarian terror, or through corruption. Andropov’s perso-
nal popularity and endorsement of Andropov-style reforms are typical also 
for modern Russia; wider population support was based on the following 
factors: his resolute authoritative style of government, fi ght against corrupt 
offi  cials, modesty in personal life, non-infringement on foundations of 
system’s principles, reinforcement of defense structures, emphasis on esta-
blishment of discipline and order in population everyday life. After the dis-
sipation of Brezhnev years, and unlimited power of the ruling top nomencla-
ture, the Andropov’s actions oriented at its limitation were endorsed by 
majority of ordinary Soviet citizens.
His success was closely connected to relative economic progress 
associated with the politics of establishment of order and discipline in the 
fi rst months of his government. The centrally planned economy once again 
proved to be viable in extreme conditions and all-round mobilization. Once, 
the eff ect of a new leader and government wearied off , the growth rate retur-
ned to “normalcy”, economic stagnation in consumer sectors re-established 
in the Soviet Union (although military-oriented sectors experienced slow 
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of technologies and quality of goods produced in the USSR, the CSSR and 
other Eastern bloc countries.
Although, Andropov new political views and modifi ed economic 
policy didn’t bring the revolutionary changes to the Soviet Union’s or satelli-
tes’ life, it created conditions under which the entry of new political repre-
sentation to the scene in the USSR was made possible. New garniture of the 
Soviet reformers led by Mikhail Gorbachev drew inspiration in Andropov’s pu-
blic appearances style, self-confi dence and self-assertion in Party’s hierar-
chy. Andropov new approach to the ordinary Soviet people welfare, his own 
modesty, disregard for Brezhnev’s era ideals, and exposure of living style of 
the top nomenclature can be considered as his greatest achievements. In or-
der to buttress the political role of the Party, he unwittingly changed the 
Soviet politics and its socialist economic principles, which led to crumbling 
of the Soviet system and the whole Soviet Union during the following drama-
tic historical period.
growth explained by renewed arms race in 1983–1985). The economic re-
forms (“economic experiment”, limited decentralization, modifi ed agricul-
tural policy, new legislation) were not applied properly and thoroughly; par-
tial economic indicators’ improvement was caused mainly by another 
mobilization of population (for example, the control over employees’ pres-
ence at the working place was exercised by local KGB organization).
Actual reasons of slow-down of economic growth, such as low adap-
tability of economy to ongoing changes on the world market, persistence of 
backward industrial structure, low labor productivity and quality of goods, 
inconsistent realization of planned adjustment of economic mechanism, re-
sistance to changes of the high-ranked nomenclature were tackled by the old 
administrative measures. Ideological limitations of Andropov did not allow 
him to enforce or attempt to reorganize the economic structure. Another re-
ason, apart from unfavorable development on the world market, was low ef-
fi ciency of the planning mechanism in centrally administered economy. It 
emerged and formed under the diff erent conditions, thereby was not capable 
of natural evolution to the intensive type of economic growth.
Due to the fact Andropov’s reforms represented certain modifi cati-
on of predecessors’ policies, the Czechoslovak-Soviet relations developed in 
accordance with past economic trends. The new General Secretary policy did 
not substantially change the pattern of articles exchange. As it was showed 
in the second part of the paper, the growth of volume of trade was caused by 
changed terms of trade and increase of commodities’ prices, not by its gro-
wing intensity or rise of technological level of goods. 
The analysis of the development of bilateral cooperation confi rms 
the continuation of former trend and exchange principle in the Soviet-
Czechoslovak trade “fuels, energy and raw materials for machinery produc-
tion and consumer products”. The character of wide joint investment activi-
ty registered in the fi rst half of the 1980’s, including Andropov years, aimed 
at development of cooperation primarily in mining sector in the USSR and 
machinery and chemical sectors in the CSSR; it has further strengthened the 
principle of commodities for machines exchange.
In the period from 1982 to 1984 the attempts were made to inten-
sify and extend the borders of mutual cooperation by accepting new pro-
grams of scientifi c-technological cooperation. Although there are examples 
of successful bilateral projects, the majority of inventions or innovative me-
thods were never actually applied; explanation of the missing link in the 
socialist economies between theoretical research and fi nished product 
(mentioned in the part devoted to R&D cooperation) describe the obsolescence 
